# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 13 August 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Michel Servais (Belgium)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 631st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As I announced at last Tuesday's plenary meeting, today I will be submitting to the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/1160. We will proceed to adopt the document as soon as we have run through the list of speakers.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Austria, Argentina, Romania (who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) and India and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I now give the floor to the representative of Austria, Ambassador Lang.

Mr. LANG (Austria) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on taking up the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament and to greet you as the representative of a country very close to mine. We are convinced that you will carry out your responsibilities with your customary brio.

Today, 31 years to the day after the building of the Berlin Wall, we realize how far the world has come in the last few years. I believe that the new international situation has greatly contributed to the progress achieved in working towards a chemical weapons ban. Just under a week after the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, it is certainly appropriate for me to dwell on the subject a little. Unfortunately, I am doing so without the great satisfaction I would have liked to have shown. The consensus that we still hoped for a short time ago on the chemical weapons convention has not been totally achieved. The untiring efforts of Ambassador von Wagner of Germany might have led us to hope for a more unequivocal outcome. Austria keenly regrets that complete and unambiguous consensus was not reached last Friday. We hope that all the States which expressed reservations on the proposed amendments contained in document CD/CW/WP.427 will be able to join those who considered that the negotiations had already been completed on 7 August. As a State participating in CSCE, we hope most particularly that the Russian Federation will be able to join the consensus which we would like to see emerge on 26 August. If not, what will happen if the Russian Federation, a signatory of the Charter of Paris, were not to be among the original signatories of the chemical weapons convention? More specifically, what would happen to the commitment entered into by all the parties to the Charter of Paris, that they would be among the original signatories of the convention?

As for the Conference on Disarmament itself, we believe that the lack of a consensus would sap its credibility, since we would be forced to acknowledge its inablility to abide by one of its basic principles - the principle of consensus contained in rule 18 of the rules of procedure. Austria would therefore be satisfied if the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons were able

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to break out of the unusual situation it found itself in last week when its Chairman stated that the end of negotiations had been reached whereas certain countries held a contrary view. In this context, we should also note that the Ad Hoc Committee's decision on a headquarters for the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons was not obtained by traditional consensus methods.

While stressing Austria's great interest in the finalization of the text of the convention, I have pleasure in introducing two purely technical studies on the question of "capable" facilities. Going beyond the definition in the text submitted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, which I would describe as political, you will find a scientist's approach to this problem of definition.

At this stage where we have already started talking about the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament, I would also like to pay tribute to the presidency of one of your predecessors, Ambassador García Moritán of the Argentine Republic, who is in fact the next person on the list of speakers today. I would in particular like to welcome what he said on 26 May about the expansion of the membership of this Conference. In the view of my delegation, this subject should be reconsidered seriously at the same time as matters relating to its agenda, which, it should be recalled, dates back to 1979. At that time, the international community had a more rigid structure, was less of a ferment of expectations and had a rather settled membership. Now, if we look at the draft report of the Conference on Disarmament to the forty-seventh General Assembly of the United Nations, we will note inter alia that one of the member States of this Conference no longer exists, namely Yugoslavia, whereas 19 countries are still waiting for full membership. In the case of Austria, the wait has lasted some 10 years now, while reports go on repeating that the Conference duly recognizes the "urgency attached to the question of the expansion of its membership". But we have learned, alas! to read these reports and translate them into more realistic language. Austria has been patient in the past, since we have understood that the composition of this multilateral disarmament body could be explained in terms of the international circumstances of an earlier time. However, today more than ever before, Austria is wondering how far real participation could be useful to it and whether it should not instead concentrate its efforts within CSCE, a body which we think is more efficient, or at least is closer to our immediate interests. We might note that on 4 March the States participating in CSCE adopted the 1992 Vienna Document, in which all confidence-building and security-building measures negotiated to date are reflected. It also contains new agreements on the expanded exchange of information on armed forces and on the lowering of declaration thresholds for military activities. Furthermore and in particular, for the first time military activities are truly restricted and can henceforth be inspected by multinational teams.

The second important document produced by CSCE this year is the Helsinki Document. One of the primary aspects of this document is that it recognizes the importance of mutual support among various European and transatlantic organizations and their cooperation with CSCE with a view to maintaining stability and security. CSCE has declared itself a "regional

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arrangement" in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Contributions from NATO, the Western European Union and the European Community to CSCE peace-keeping operations are henceforth possible. Furthermore, Austria will certainly derive great benefit from pursuing the discussion it has just embarked on with the Western European Union. It will draw its own conclusions as to the possible restructuring of its policy in the field of security.

A priori, Austria has no intention of standing aside from global efforts to promote disarmament and security. We simply feel that in a world where peace and disarmament are mutually linked and indivisible, there can be no reason to exclude one sovereign State rather than another from participating in a joint effort to achieve disarmament and confidence-building.

Austria would be sorry if a universalist view of the world, as expressed in the United Nations Charter, were to take a back seat as continents became more inward-looking. This is why a reorganization of the Disarmament Commission in order to strengthen its impact on the political and military state of affairs in the world seems to us an attractive idea. In the same vein, effective Austrian participation in the Conference on Disarmament will in the future also be tied to the condition that there should be a true political will among all the member countries to accomplish concrete tasks. In this regard, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control - I am referring to item 10 on the Conference's standing agenda - is not at all concrete and, we believe, only helps to encourage the eternal drawing out of fruitless discussions, although, of course, the subject is based on the most noble of ambitions.

We believe, in contrast, that it is better to tackle concrete projects such as the one outlined to this forum on 23 July by Ambassador Hyltenius - that of negotiating a treaty to prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities. This would be done separately from work on radiological weapons. Austria, which has no civilian or military nuclear facilities, would like to avoid being the victim of such an attack, which might be directed at one of the nuclear power stations located in a neighbouring country. Consequently it supports Sweden's proposal.

Turning to a subject which several commentators believe will ensure the survival of the Conference on Disarmament, and whose objective we warmly support, namely transparency in armaments, we were very interested to read the draft report on the subject as well as various documents relating to the Tokyo workshop held at the beginning of June 1992. Unfortunately we cannot draw the conclusion that there is a sufficient convergence of views among the members of the Conference. We therefore see no certainty that the efforts made in this field will bear fruit in the foreseeable future.

In order to work on concrete tasks, the Conference on Disarmament could in the future serve as a verification and review body for various conventions which have been in existence for a long time, with a view to making them really effective. The Conference could sit permanently, unlike the ordinary review conferences, which meet only at long intervals. This would constitute

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true progress and would help us to forget that the institutionalization of review work related to the Convention on biological weapons has not proved possible despite the efforts of many countries, including Austria. Apart from the treaty I have just referred to, permanent verification work could be contemplated under article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, article IX of the outer space Treaty, article VII of the seabed Treaty, article VIII of the ENMOD Convention or article 8 of the Convention on certain conventional weapons.

In any event, one area in which it will be intrinsically impossible for any region to turn in on itself, and one to which the Conference on Disarmament must attach priority importance, is that of nuclear testing. We might recall that the explosive force of all nuclear tests carried out since 1945 is equivalent to that of 40 Hiroshima bombs. Far too often these tests have devastating effects on the regions affected. Hence the continuation of nuclear tests seems to us to be irresponsible from both the medical and the environmental viewpoints. In this regard the letter which the President of the French Republic, Mr. François Mitterrand, sent to the heads of State of the other nuclear Powers on 8 April proposing the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is a promising development and the respective commitments of France and the Russian Federation to suspend tests temporarily are encouraging. Nevertheless, there has not yet been any definitive abandonment of these tests - quite the contrary, nuclear explosions follow one after another. The arguments submitted in favour of such tests, namely that they are necessary in order to improve the security systems for nuclear weapons, to check the reliability of stockpiled nuclear warheads and to modernize nuclear arms, are very questionable.

Austria has always been committed to the cessation of all nuclear tests. It ratified the Moscow partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty in 1964 and has always spoken out in favour of United Nations resolutions advocating a total ban. Austria will vigorously maintain this position and will provide support for efforts to conclude a complete nuclear-test-ban treaty - all the more so since on behalf of my Government and by means of this statement I have the honour to transmit to the nuclear powers represented in this forum an appeal from the Chamber of Deputies of the Austrian Parliament, the Nationalrat. This appeal, dated 5 June 1992, calls for an immediate end to all nuclear tests without waiting for the creation of an international commitment to that end. In that context, it therefore goes without saying that we appreciate the study also calling for the cessation of nuclear tests, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by Norway on 1 June in document CD/1151. Echoing Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, we hope that the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will not be too long in coming.

In the statement I made on 13 February last, I had occasion to congratulate those States which had decided to become parties to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Allow me therefore to welcome the commitment of the United States of America to the indefinite extension of the NPT. We also welcome France's accession to this Treaty 10 days ago. All the permanent members of the Security Council have now become parties to this Treaty which is so vital for the survival of mankind.

(Mr. Lang, Austria)

Finally, I would like to join all those who have already expressed their pleasure at the application of the INF Treaty, the conclusion of the START Treaty, the Lisbon Agreements signed on 23 May between Byelorussia, the United States, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, as well as the various Russian and American initiatives to reduce their nuclear weapons as well as the announcements of the same nature made by France, the United Kingdom and NATO. All this constitutes promising progress. I would therefore like to conclude by expressing the hope that the dimunition of the danger of nuclear war made possible by the end of the East-West confrontation will not reduce our vigilence vis-à-vis the many sources of instability which despite everything seem to proliferate throughout the world.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Austria for his statement and for the encouragement extended to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): On the first day that you took the Chair, Mr. President, I had occasion to declare our confidence in your new responsibilities. We have had more than one opportunity to see how right our opinion was.

The Conference on Disarmament, as we have been told repeatedly, is a body which prides itself on its traditions. Traditions that are repeated over the years. Some relate to its functioning, with its mechanisms and mysteries of procedure that time and again have proven hard to disentangle. Other traditions relate to the positions which countries and groups repeat every session on the various items on our agenda. This latter tradition, however, would seem doomed to disappear given the scope of the changes on the international political scene. Today, in making my last statement as head of the delegation of the Argentine Republic to this Conference, I wish to recall a tradition which does seem to be observed to the letter, regardless of political change or any amendments to the rules of procedure. The tradition to which I refer is that observed by the vast majority of heads of delegation before they leave this Council Chamber, that of making a brief farewell address.

Over the years distinguished colleagues, freed or feeling freed from the strait-jacket of Government instructions, set out some final reflections before the plenary before they leave. Generally speaking these have tended to reflect, with a greater or lesser degree of irony, a predominant feeling of frustration at the lack of tangible results which is almost a constant of the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Today a combination of factors allow me to share these observations with you, imbued with a different spirit from that which might perhaps have underlain any statement I might have made a few years ago. The Conference on Disarmament is finally ready to transmit to the General Assembly of the United Nations an instrument of the importance of the convention on chemical weapons, which, above and beyond the assessment it falls to each of us to make of it, is a genuinely multilateral agreement. On arriving at this Conference on Disarmament I had the great honour to read one of the main instructions which the President of my country gave me on

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

taking up the task which today I complete: one of those instructions was to work actively to ensure that the convention on chemical weapons was concluded as soon as possible. Precisely as far as it was able, the Argentine delegation has worked to that end. This chapter, therefore, is beginning to draw to a close.

The Conference finally seems to be parting the heavy curtains of the Council Chamber to become a vital and operational body, a real instrument for world peace and stability. The convention on chemical weapons, the details of which we are now finalizing, will in the coming months ineluctably leave the Geneva circle which gave it birth to move on to the practical terrain of implementation, mainly in The Hague and also in each of our capitals, where the national authorities will breathe life into it by ensuring strict compliance. The convention on chemical weapons is for many of us already part of the negotiating history of this Conference. Other individuals and other groups will now be responsible for it. The void left by the convention on chemical weapons has the merit in a way of obliging the Conference on Disarmament to face the issue of its own future development. This has been mentioned on various occasions in the context of questioning this body's future raison d'être when the bustle in room V has ceased.

This leads us to mention again a matter that was tabled by Argentina here and in New York two years ago: the need to draw up a new operational agenda that can realistically and practically meet the security challenges of the last five years of the century. The recent report prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros-Ghali, entitled "An agenda for peace", reminds us what the circumstances are and what the questions are we have to take up. Today it would seem that the most urgent questions on the international security agenda relate to peace-keeping, transparency in armaments, the nuclear testing issue, the strengthening and consolidation of agreements to eliminate and reduce weapons of mass destruction, and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The topics of a doctrinal type that perhaps could be justified given the oppressive weight of a world divided into blocs seem to have lost their raison d'être in a world where ideological debate, at least for the time being, is no longer a decisive factor in power relationships around the world. What is needed now is to work on the instrumental aspects of security, on specific action that can help prevent emergencies or crises that are destabilizing. Perhaps with the convention on chemical weapons, a pause is now occurring in the era of major disarmament agreements to allow us to move on to follow-up and prevention - a chapter, in our view, which is no less important and pressing. In this context the famous concept of preventive diplomacy might benefit from highly useful support in the Conference on Disarmament. Confidence-building measures, which have been recognized as applicable on land and in outer space, could constitute the point of convergence in the Conference capable of harmonizing experiments already under way in various parts of the world so that universally applicable confidence-building schemes can be drawn up. This conceptual approach can certainly be useful when the Conference moves forward in drawing up practical measures to strengthen openness and transparency in transfers of conventional

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

weaponry and dual technologies as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 46/36 L. This is a challenge of a practical nature for the Conference on Disarmament that should in our view be taken up without delay.

The regional approach to disarmament could also be effectively complemented by the multilateral body which once again would be the focal point of convergence of various regional and subregional initiatives in various areas with a view to harmonization. In this regard the organization of interregional crisis prevention and management centres is necessary so that global stability can rest on the pillars of collective action instead of depending on unilateral action by any given dominant force. Moving from the diplomacy of reacting to events to that of prevention will without a doubt call for a good deal of imagination and political vision. Today, when the military alliance has disappeared, when the one remaining is embarking on a thorough analysis of its future activities and redefining itself, the stage seems to be set for a multilateral contribution that can come only from the Conference on Disarmament. So we must take a very serious look at our agenda and go forward boldly on those items where a contribution can be made, while remaining ready to go back when circumstances so allow to topics that at present divide us. The philosophy of "all or nothing" must be banished from a modern body and one which is called on to play an active role in the architecture of a collective security system worthy of the name.

At the beginning of my statement I referred to tradition, and in a way I was really alluding to the past. Today, in saying farewell to this body as head of the delegation of my country, I have done so in the way that I personally prefer: speaking of the future.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Argentina, who, as he told us in his statement, was addressing our Conference for the last time as representative of his country. Ambassador García Moritán, you are well known to all of us in the field of disarmament, not only in our Conference but also in the other bodies dealing with disarmament problems. You have served the Conference on Disarmament twice as representative of Argentina and occupied posts of great responsibility such as that of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and, more recently, President of our Conference. You chaired the third review conference on the biological weapons Convention and discharged key functions as an officer of several conferences devoted to the problems of international security and disarmament. We can all bear witness to your familiarity with the problems before the Conference and your experience and skill in the sphere of multilateral diplomacy, without of course forgetting your personal qualities and your openness towards all your colleagues. You will leave many friends here in Geneva and a memory which honours your country. On behalf of all of us I wish you every well-merited success in your new diplomatic duties.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Ambassador Neagu of Romania, who is to introduce the Ad Hoc Committee's report, which has been distributed as CD/1165.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to express the pleasure and satisfaction of the Romanian delegation at seeing you in the Chair at this crucial juncture of the activity of the Conference on Disarmament. Knowing and appreciating your diplomatic skills we are sure that the concluding debates of this session will be most efficiently guided. Meantime I want to convey our congratulations to your immediate predecessor, Ambassador O'Sullivan, for the excellent work that he has done as President of the Conference.

I have the honour to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which covers the activity of the Committee during this year (CD/1165). In accordance with the mandate given to it by the Conference, the Committee has continued to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, taking into account the existing agreements as well as the relevant proposals, initiatives and developments since the establishment of the Committee in 1985.

We have used all the possibilities at our disposal in order to explore the subject and come up with substantive conclusions. Thus we held both official debates and informal consultations in an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual respect, for which I want to thank all participating delegations, and especially the group coordinators - Mr. Anastasov for the Eastern European Group, Mr. Gevers for the Western Group and Mr. Karem for the Group of 21 - as well as the representatives of China.

I would like to pay a special tribute to the Friends of the Chair: the Hon. Anthony Monckton, of the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Dr. Mahmoud Karem, of the delegation of Egypt, and Col. Gyorgy Diachenko, of the delegation of the Russian Federation, who respectively conducted open-ended consultations on the following important subjects: terminological aspects related to prevention of an arms race in outer space; issues related to verification of ASATs; and confidence-building measures in space activities.

The Committee also benefited from the scientific and technical contributions of experts from the delegations of Canada, Chechoslovakia, India, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany, to whom I want to express my sincere appreciation. I am most grateful to Ambassador Vicente Berasategui for his very thoughtful advice, and Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov for his impeccable work as Secretary of the Committee.

As was only normal, during our deliberations, different, sometimes even opposing, views were expressed. The Committee succeeded, however, as is underlined in the report, in advancing "in its efforts to identify areas of convergence suitable for more structured work". But much remains to be done in the future in order to really achieve the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Therefore we submit the proposal that substantive work on this agenda item should continue at the next session of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

The report recommends that the Conference should re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1993 session, taking into account all relevant factors, including the work of the Committee since 1985.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for introducing its report and for the kind words of encouragement he addressed to the Chair. It is my intention to submit this report to the Conference for adoption at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday, 18 August. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Mr. Wadhwa, who will speak on behalf of Ambassador Shah in his capacity as special coordinator on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban"

Mr. WADHWA (India): Mr. President, the delegation of India is extremely pleased to see you presiding over our work in this crucial period, and we wish you well in your important task. First of all, I would like to apologise on behalf of Ambassador Shah, who was supposed to report today personally on his efforts as special coordinator for agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", but has been unable to attend this plenary meeting due to other urgent commitments elsewhere in the Palais. Allow me, on his behalf, to read out the following report of the special coordinator on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban".

At the Conference's 612th plenary meeting on 13 February 1992, the President of the Conference appointed me as special coordinator to seek agreement on organizational arrangements for agenda item 1. During the course of the three sessions of the CD this year, I have carried out active and intensive consultations with delegations, bilaterally and through open-ended meetings, to ensure that there would be agreement among all delgations to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate acceptable to all. A series of proposals on a draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee's re-establishment were put forward and considered, along with a proposal for a programme of work for the 1992 session, which for some delgations was an important component of the package. Throughout these consultations, I found a general agreement among all delegations to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee this year and to start its work quickly. The growing importance of agenda item 1 was recognized by all delegations.

An overwhelming majority of delegations expressed willingness to give a mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee to continue, as a step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues. A growing number of delegations felt that the Conference on Disarmament must immediately begin serious and sustained consideration of agenda item 1, particularly in the light of the conclusion of negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. While substantial progress was made on improving the previous mandate, no final agreement has been possible up to now. It is my hope that the results achieved so far this year will not be lost sight of when efforts are continued next year to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of its 1993 session. In view of the overwhelming interest in this item among the members of the CD, I would

(Mr. Wadhwa, India)

recommend that the CD re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of the 1993 session and make urgent efforts towards a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of India for his statement and his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Dahlman, to introduce the Ad Hoc Group's progress report contained in document CD/1163.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I am pleased to report today on the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group held from 27 July to 7 August 1992 and attended by experts and representatives from 27 countries, and to introduce document CD/1163 containing the Group's progress report.

The work of the Ad Hoc Group has during the last years been concentrated on the conduct and the evaluation of the Group's second large-scale technical test (GSETT-2). The Group is now about to finalize the reporting of this successful undertaking. A summary of the main results was presented to the CD earlier this year in CD/1144.

At this session the Group completed five quite voluminous appendices to this report. These appendices, which are an integral part of the Group's sixth report, contain a detailed account of the test and of the scientific and technical results obtained. This information will be useful for the Group's further work. Due to their technical nature the appendices will not be circulated within the CD but kept as documents of the Group and be available through the secretariat. The secretariat has as always done excellent work in supporting the Group.

The seismological evaluation is now the only remaining item of GSETT-2 to be reported on. This evaluation requires considerable effort and access to reference material for the actual test period provided by scientific institutes around the world. The Group continued its discussion of this issue and agreed to focus the seismological evaluation on the detection and location capabilities achieved during GSETT-2. The Group plans to finalize a report on this evaluation at its next session.

The backbone of the Group's work is results from national investigations conducted in individual countries or in cooperation between countries. Some 40 reports on such investigations were presented during the session. I will choose a few examples from this important flow of information.

Several investigations illustrated the high detection and location capabilities obtained by national or regional networks of seismological stations. Such networks can, as will be discussed later, be useful also in the context of global monitoring.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The detection capabilities of individual stations are critically dependent on the prevailing background disturbances or noise at the actual site. Based on data obtained from GSETT-2 a thorough investigation of the noise situation at stations around the globe was presented. This showed a most significant variation between sites and clearly illustrated the importance of selecting the sites carefully to obtain seismological stations with high performance.

In addition to detecting individual events that occur it might, in a monitoring situation, be important to know that no events above a certain level have occurred in a given region during a specific time period. A national investigation described a method to estimate the actual monitoring capability of a certain region from the analysis of continuously available noise data.

In my last example of national contributions, satellite photos were used to pinpoint the precise locations of open-pit mines from which seismological signals were recorded, thereby helping in calibrating the seismological observations. This illustrates the usefulness of combining various technologies in developing a monitoring system.

The Group devoted most of its efforts during the session to discussing the reassessment of the concept of the global monitoring system described in its fifth report (CD/903). The discussions were focused on the overall design of the system and provided a basis and an outline for the Group's future work.

The Group noted that many of the results and experiences obtained in GSETT-2 will be important in reassessing the overall concept of the system and its various components. Some of the more important are as follows.

First, the need for a network with adequate global coverage of high-quality stations, especially arrays. GSETT-2 showed a strong regional variation in detection and location capabilities reflecting not only the uneven station distribution but also strong variation in station sensitivities and capabilities. The seismic arrays again proved to be most useful.

Second, the need to take into account information from local and regional seismic networks; such modern and high-performance networks are today operating in many parts of the globe and could provide information of great importance for a global monitoring system.

Third, the future use of only one international data centre (IDC) in the global system; during GSETT-2 four experimental IDCs were used, which provided valuable experience. Technical and other developments not only make it possible but also desirable to use only one IDC to serve the future system.

Fourth, the need to improve and automate analysis procedures. GSETT-2 provided the EIDCs with a large amount of wave-form or level II data. The full potential of these comprehensive recordings was not fully utilized during the test due to lack of adequate analysis methods and procedures.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

Over the last decade, scientific and technological developments have been significant not only in seismology, but also in information technology, an area of great importance for global seismological monitoring systems. The Group firmly believes that the design of the global system should fully utilize recent developments in science and technology. The Group identified the following areas as being important for the overall system concept: the rapid developments in global telecommunication, making high-speed communication available globally; the general availability of high-performance computers and methods and procedures for data management and analysis; and finally, the developments in regional seismology, i.e., that based on seismological observations at distances of less than 2,000 km, making it possible to fully utilize data from national and regional networks.

In considering preliminary design concepts the Group also tentatively discussed the various products that might be available to the users from alternative system designs. Although this question requires further consideration, the Group noted that it would be desirable to estimate the detection, location and identification capabilities of alternative system designs. It further considers that the issues of redundancy, data authenticity, reliability and security are important.

As to the overall conceptual design, the Group agreed on the following tentative framework for studying design options. In its work so far the Group has been focusing on a global network of some 50 stations as the basis of the system. The Group is now considering alternative global networks of high-quality arrays and single stations. The networks should be modelled based on the results of the best stations in operation during GSETT-2. The number of stations in the networks could be extended or reduced to demonstrate networks of varying sensitivity. By estimating costs for each alternative network a cost-capability relation for the monitoring systems might be illustrated. The global network should be complemented by national and regional networks primarily used to report on seismic events occurring within their territories.

The system should contain only one international data centre. This should be built on the experience gained at the four experimental IDCs operated so far. Special efforts should be made to improve quality control, automation and procedures for wave-form analysis. The IDC should be able to receive and process continuous wave-form data should that prove to be valuable.

The Ad Hoc Group established nine working groups of participating experts to elaborate on the following topics relevant to the design of the global system: overall concepts, station design, site selection, network studies, seismological procedures, establishment of a single international data centre, communications, interaction by the IDC with national and regional networks, and cost estimates. These working groups became actively engaged during the session in defining their main tasks, which should be elaborated on between now and the Group's next session.

The Canadian delegation has invited GSE experts to a workshop in November 1992. This will provide a valuable opportunity to continue discussions within and among the working groups.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The Ad Hoc Group noted with appreciation the convening of a similar informal technical workshop by Australia in Canberra from 27 April to 1 May 1992, which proved useful in evaluation of the results of GSETT-2.

The Group has on earlier occasions benefited from technical discussions with international organizations such as the World Meteorological Organization and INMARSAT, and representatives from these organizations have participated in the Group's meetings as observers at the invitation of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Ad Hoc Group now considers it to be useful to share with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the GSE technical concepts for the global exchange of seismic data in order to determine if IAEA has particular technologies or experiences that might be useful to the Group in its work. To this end, the Ad Hoc Group suggests that, without any financial implications to the Conference, IAEA should be invited to send an observer to attend the Ad Hoc Group's next session.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 15 to 26 February 1993.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Dr. Dahlman, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, for introducing the Group's report. I shall put before the Conference for decision at our next plenary meeting the recommendation contained in paragraph 15 of the report concerning the dates of the Group's next session.

We have now come to the end of the list of speakers. Are there any other delegations that would like to take the floor? Mr. Siahaan of Indonesia, you have the floor.

Mr. SIAHAAN (Indonesia): I take the floor on behalf of the Group of 21 to place on record our disappointment concerning the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", this year. This failure occurs despite the renewed effort to that end, the improved international political climate and the overwhelming endorsement in the United Nations General Assembly of the call for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The Group of 21 has consistently advocated and attached utmost importance to the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Bringing an end to nuclear tests for weapons purposes is the most urgent and crucial issue in the field of disarmament. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is long overdue. The Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body in this field has the primary role in carrying out negotiations to achieve this objective.

(Mr. Siahaan, Indonesia)

Today we note the progress achieved by the signing of the INF Treaty, the START Treaty, as well as unilateral measures and the recent agreement between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin to make significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of their two countries. These are positive developments, but these could not make a CTBT less essential. Besides, bilateral and multilateral efforts should be complementary.

The conclusion of a CTBT will be a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons as well as preventing their proliferation. Proliferation in all its aspects must be stopped, and nuclear weapons cannot be considered as a legitimate source or means to enhance the political status of countries. Moreover, a CTBT would also help to alleviate the concern about the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear testing.

It is encouraging to note that the Russian Federation and France have announced voluntary moratoriums on testing. The Group of 21 urgently calls on the other three nuclear Powers to make similar commitments and expects all nuclear Powers to then continue with the moratoriums until the actual treaty is signed and ratified.

As has been repeatedly demonstrated in the past, in this year's session of the CD the Group of 21 has shown flexibility in the search for a consensus on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee as evidenced by the various proposals put forward to that end. But the Conference on Disarmament has met with a setback in this regard, as a result of the obstacles laid down by certain nuclear Powers belonging to one group, despite the willingness of the vast majority of the members of the Conference on Disarmament to engage in serious negotiations. The flexibility of the Group of 21 on the draft mandate should not be misconstrued. It will not be useful to re-establish a subsidiary body if it will not be able to achieve its objective. To ensure progress in its work towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty at an early date, the subsidiary body should be provided with an adequate negotiating mandate.

In conclusion, the Group of 21 urges that the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", be re-established at the beginning of the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament with an adequate negotiating mandate.

Mr. HLAING (Myanmar): Mr. President, may I begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the CD for this month? I also wish to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, for the effective manner in which he steered the work of the CD during his tenure of presidency. I should also like to welcome to our midst Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya and Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland who have just joined us in the CD.

In my statement in the plenary on 25 June I dwelt on the question of chemical weapons. In my statement today I should like to touch upon nuclear issues on the agenda of the CD. In recent years we have witnessed dramatic transformations in the international political climate, in the relationship

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between the major military Powers and in the strategic landscape of the world. The cold war has become a thing of the past and has given way to new patterns of relationship and cooperation between the major groups of countries. This has generated favourable conditions for arms limitation and disarmament and has indeed led to a number of significant agreements on arms limitation and disarmament such as the INF and START treaties as well as the unilateral steps taken by the United States and the Russian Federation to eliminate land-based short-range nuclear weapons. We hope that such a favourable international political climate will lend added impetus to the negotiations in the CD on nuclear issues.

A number of significant developments which have a direct bearing on the question of a nuclear test ban have taken place recently. These include, inter alia, the following:

The number of nuclear tests by the nuclear-weapon States has significantly declined in the post-cold-war era;

Some nuclear-weapon States have recently announced a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests;

The announcement by France of her decision to ratify additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the announcement made by the French delegation that it will participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban when the Ad Hoc Committee is re-established.

It is regrettable that, while a number of significant developments having a direct bearing on this question have taken place recently, the CD should find itself unable to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban during the 1992 session. We hope that the CD will be able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with an adequate negotiating mandate to commence its substantive work at an early date in its 1993 session.

The CD has been holding informal meetings on agenda items 2 and 3 for the past several years. My delegation feels that in the light of the aforementioned positive developments we should take a fresh look at these agenda items and see whether it will be possible to adopt a more effective format for dealing with these important questions. We believe that, at the very least, discussions on agenda items 2 and 3 should be well structured so that delegations may be able to address the key issues related to these questions in depth and in a more goal-oriented manner.

My delegation attaches great importance to all the nuclear issues on the agenda of the CD. Not the least among them is agenda item 6, on negative security assurances. My delegation firmly believes that the major changes in the international political climate and the subsequent positive developments have provided a very good opportunity to take a fresh look at the question of NSA. As we are fully aware, the notion of NSA goes as far back as the late 1960s. The consideration of this agenda item in the CD through all those years has not been fruitful. We believe that it is now high time to address

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this issue in a serious and businesslike manner. We hope that we will be able to further pursue substantive in-depth discussions on this important issue during next year's annual session of the CD.

Mr. FELICIO (Brazil): Mr. President, since this is the first intervention of my delegation under your presidency, let me congratulate you on your assumption of your functions at this important juncture. At the meeting at which Ambassador García Moritán has addressed the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament for the last time before returning to Buenos Aires, where other important duties await him, I could not miss the opportunity of joining you in the words you addressed to him. I might add that this Conference will miss Ambassador García Moritán, this outstanding diplomat of Argentina and close friend of us all. The diplomatic skills and personal friendship of Ambassador García Moritán with the Brazilian authorities played a fundamental role in the bilateral understandings of our two countries in the nuclear field. I am proud to have participated with Ambassador García Moritán in that exercise, during which I could admire him and learn with him. I wish him all success in his future endeavours.

Briefly let me revert to the presentation of the report by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in charge of considering international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events. In paragraph 14 of the report of that Group it is suggested that IAEA should be invited to send an observer to attend its next session. It is the understanding of my delegation that IAEA will be invited to share the experience it might have on technical aspects of data management and transmission. May I suggest that when the invitation is addressed to IAEA it be done in those precise terms? I would also suggest that, when addressing the invitation to IAEA, it should be referred to by its proper name of International Atomic Energy Agency, and not "authority" as the Agency is called in the report.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Mr. Felício, not only for your comments on the IAEA but also for the words of encouragement you addressed to me, as indeed did Ambassador Hlaing a little earlier, and I think that I may thank you on behalf of Ambassador García Moritán for the really very kind words you addressed to him. As the last speaker who asked for the floor I have the representative of Chile, Mr. González.

Mr. GONZALEZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, since this is the first time that my delegation is taking the floor with you in the Chair of this Conference, we should like to congratulate you most particularly on taking up this important post, bearing in mind not only your acknowledged professional skills but the special ties of friendship between Chile and your country.

This morning we were disagreeably surprised to hear the announcement made by the distinguished friend, and I emphasize the word friend, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán concerning the ending of his tenure as representative of his country in this Conference. Apart from the ties of friendship that unite us with Ambassador García Moritán we feel it is right to emphasize that his contribution in the Conference on

(Mr. González, Chile)

Disarmament has been professionally and technically speaking of the highest value and has helped to bring about an atmosphere of greater trust, greater predictability in relations between States on this subject and at the same time he has carried forward a number of initiatives together with other Latin American countries, and specifically my country, which we certainly particularly appreciate. We should therefore like to state explicitly for the record that Ambassador García Moritán's departure is a matter of regret to the delegation of Chile and we hope that we will be able to work with him and continue to work with him on these subjects, in some other place. Ambassador García Moritán in his farewell statement gave us a rapid and conceptual analysis of the need to restructure the Conference on Disarmament's agenda, something to which my country attaches the highest importance. Some of the points he raised, if not all, are of particular importance for Chile, such as a halt to nuclear testing and the building of a greater climate of trust in general. In this regard we should like to recall that it was the distinguished delegation of Argentina, and specifically Ambassador García Moritán, who a few years back submitted an initiative for the creation of a climate of encouragement in confidence-building measures under the item on prohibition of an arms race in outer space, a topic of crucial importance, bearing in mind the fact that a number of events have come about which it is really important to settle, such as that related to space debris, for example, and the subsequent need to reformulate or recast certain articles of the registration Convention. Finally, on similar lines, we should like to reiterate what we have already said on two occasions in this forum, concerning the possibility our country is considering of holding, together with other Latin American countries, a Latin American conference in Santiago on mutual confidence-building measures, which to our mind is absolutely consistent with what has been said earlier.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Mr. González, who spoke on behalf of Chile and also thanked Ambassador García Moritán and myself. I am very happy to receive such encouragement. I propose now, if there are no further speakers on the list who wish to take the floor, that we should proceed to the adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/1160, which was introduced to you last week. If there are no objections, I will take it that the Conference adopts this report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I have asked the secretariat to distribute today the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, it is merely indicative and can be changed if the need arises. May I take it that the Conference adopts the timetable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): At the request of Ambassador Zahran, the special coordinator for agenda item 9, entitled "Transparency in armaments", I would like to inform you that he will be holding informal consultations with the coordinators and other interested delegations on the draft annual report to the General Assembly in conference room I as soon as this plenary is over.

I have no further business on the agenda for today, and I therefore propose to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday, 18 August 1992, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.